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ARGUMENTS 
1^ 
THE VIDEOTAPE OF THE ENCOUNTER CLEARLY REVEALS THAT THE 
SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS CONDUCTED AS A PURPORTED 
"INVENTORY SEARCH" AND APPELLANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED 
WITH THE INSTANT APPEAL BECAUSE ANY ERROR MADE BY APPELLANT'S 
COUNSEL IS HARMLESS. 
It is abundantly clear from the videotape of the encounter 
in the instant case that the police officers proceeded with the 
search of Appellant's vehicle as a purported "inventory search" 
and not as a search incident to arrest. As is apparent from the 
videotape, the officers informed Appellant that his vehicle was 
allegedly "being impounded" and that the officers were 
proceeding with an "inventory search" of his vehicle. (Video at 
18:45:40 - 18:53:00). Moreover it is apparent from the State's 
Brief of Appellee dated March 31, 1999, that the State 
repeatedly refers to the search of Appellant's vehicle as a so-
called "inventory search" and never once refers to it as a 
search incident to arrest. See Brief of Appellee at 6,7. 
Nevertheless, the State argues that use of the wrong term to 
characterize the search somehow renders Appellant's entire 
Appeal, Brief and arguments therein invalid. 
The State's reliance on State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228, 
1229 (Utah App. 1992) to support its contention that the instant 
appeal should be summarily dismissed because Appellant 
inadvertently neglected to properly label the trial court's 
decision upholding the search in this case as a search incident 
to arrest is misplaced. In Rodriguez, the court failed to 
address the constitutional claims raised in the defendant's 
appeal because Appellant had neglected to argue in his appeal 
that he had standing to raise the constitutional issues. 
Because standing is a threshold question when asserting Fourth 
Amendment rights, the Rodriguez court found that because the 
defendant had not even addressed much less demonstrated 
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standing, that the court need not reach the merits of the 
appeal. 
Unlike Rodriguez, in the instant case, Appellant has not 
failed to address any threshold guestion such as standing or 
jurisdiction which is necessary to proceed with the appeal. 
While Appellant's counsel inadvertently neglected to argue in 
Appellant's Opening Brief that the search in this case was not a 
proper search incident to arrest, the error was due to the clear 
statements and actions of the officers in the videotape of the 
encounter from which the officers purported to conduct an 
"inventory search" of Appellant's vehicle. No rational 
inference could be drawn from the videotape that the search was 
performed as a search incident to arrest/ and in any event, the 
search was not proper regardless of the particular label 
assigned to the officers' actions. Because Appellant has 
addressed the validity of the search as "a search incident to 
arrest" below, the error made by Appellant's counsel is harmless 
and Appellant should be permitted to proceed with the instant 
appeal. 
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II. 
THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED AS AN 
INVENTORY SEARCH OR A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST. 
The State has consciously avoided the arguments and 
authorities cited in Appellant's Opening Brief. Appellant 
clearly explained why the officers1 alleged inventory search was 
invalid, and the State has presented no contrary argument or 
authority to demonstrate otherwise. Indeed, warrantless 
searches are presumptively illegal. Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967). A few specifically established exceptions 
which have been "jealously and carefully drawn," will justify 
the admission of evidence obtained from a warrantless search. 
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). One such 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is 
that police officers may perform a search incident to arrest. 
Under this exception, "a contemporaneous, warrantless search of 
the area within an arrestee's immediate control is permissible 
for the purpose of recovering weapons the arrestee might reach, 
or to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence of the 
crime [for which he has been arrested]." State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769, 784 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). 
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The State's reliance on this exception is as misplaced as its 
reliance at trial upon the inventory search exception. 
The courts have been careful to ensure that the scope of a 
search incident to arrest remains closely limited to its 
underlying purpose- The Supreme Court stated in New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2862, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 
(1981) that the scope of a search incident to arrest must be 
"strictly tied to and justified by circumstances which rendered 
its initiation permissible." The Utah Court of Appeals has 
defined the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement as follows: 
[A]n arresting officer may, without a warrant, lawfully 
search the area surrounding the person he or she is 
arresting if: (1) the arrest is lawful, (2) the search is 
of the area within the arrestee's immediate control, and 
(3) the search is conducted contemporaneously to the 
arrest [.] In other words, the search must be conducted 
pursuant to a lawful arrest and cannot be remote in place 
or time from the arrest. 
State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) 
(quoting Chime1, 395 U.S. at 764, 89 S.Ct at 2040. 
While it is true that "doubt about the arrestee's ability 
to access weapons or evidence in a particular area because of 
distance, or police restraint, does not [necessarily] prohibit 
the police from searching that area", State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 
1245, 1247 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) , Utah courts have noted that the 
arrestee's ability to reach into the area searched by the police 
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must be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of 
the search. 
In the recent case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 979 
(Utah App. 1998), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that the 
reasonableness of a search incident to arrest must be determined 
from the totality of the circumstances with consideration given 
to the following factors: 
(1) Mw]hether or not the arrestee was placed in some sort 
of restraints"; (2) "[t]he position of the officer vis-a-
vis the defendant in relation to the place searched"; (3) 
Mt]he ease or difficulty of gaining access to the searched 
area or item; and (4) "[t]he number of officers present in 
relation to the number or arrestees or other persons." 
In Gallegos, police officers went to the defendant's home 
to execute an arrest warrant. Upon entry into the house, the 
officers discovered the defendant hiding in a hole which had 
been cut into the floor and covered by carpet. The officers 
ordered the defendant out of the hole with guns drawn and then 
immediately took him into custody and placed him in handcuffs. 
The officers then removed the defendant to the living room of 
the house. After another officer arrived to watch the 
defendant, the arresting officers then returned to the room 
where the defendant was arrested and conducted a further search 
to ensure that there were no unsecured additional weapons in the 
room. During this search, one of the officers noticed a purple 
tin on a shelf in the closet of the bedroom. The officer 
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inspected the tin and found five plastic baggies, two containing 
cocaine residue and two containing methamphetamine residue. 
The defendant was then charged with possession of a gun by 
a restricted person, possession of cocaine and possession of 
methamphetamine. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
gun and the tin. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, 
finding that the gun was properly seized during the search 
incident to arrest of the defendant and that the tin was 
properly seized under the plain view doctrine. 
On appeal, the defendant asserted that the tin was not 
sufficiently within defendant's immediate control at the time of 
the arrest to justify the search. The state countered that the 
search of a room in which a defendant is arrested is per se a 
reasonable search incident to arrest. 
Refusing to accept such an expansive interpretation of the 
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, 
the Gallegos court stated: 
Rejecting the State's contention as too broad, we hold that 
the State must demonstrate that the area searched was 
reasonably within defendant's control at the time of his 
arrest before evidence obtained in that search can be 
admitted under the "search incident to arrest" exception to 
the warrant requirement. 
Gallegos at 979. 
The Gallegos court found that case similar to the Utah 
Court of Appeals decision in State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah 
7 
Ct.App. 1996). In that case, the court reviewed the search of a 
jacket liner when the defendant was not close to his jacket but 
the police had been informed by the defendant's girlfriend that 
there was cocaine in the jacket liner. Finding it troublesome 
that the arresting officer's testimony did not indicate how far 
the defendant was from the jacket when he was arrested and 
handcuffed, the Wells court refused to find the search of the 
lining of the jacket justifiable as a search incident to arrest, 
since defendant was in handcuffs, was separated from the jacket 
by two police officers, and was arrested in a room different 
from where the jacket was located. 
As in Gallegos and Wells, no search of Appellant's vehicle 
incident to Appellant's arrest is justifiable in the instant 
case. The video tape of the encounter in the instant case 
clearly reveals that Appellant was not only separated by a 
considerable distance of approximately 20 feet, he had already 
been taken into custody and placed in handcuffs. Additionally, 
there were three officer between the hand-cuffed Appellant and 
the vehicle. It is further abundantly clear from the videotape 
of the encounter that due to the distance between Appellant and 
the vehicle, the fact that Appellant had been placed in 
handcuffs, and the fact that Appellant was separated from the 
vehicle by two police officers, that Appellant could not 
possibly have reached into the vehicle to obtain a weapon or 
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destroy evidence. Finally, the videotape reveals that during 
the lengthy search of Appellant's vehicle, the officers spent 
approximately twenty minutes using tools to dismantle the seat 
of Appellant's vehicle in order to gain access to the area 
behind the seat where the police found marijuana. 
Clearly, the time-consuming process of dismantling the seat 
in order to gain access to the area where the marijuana was 
found reveals that Appellant could not possibly have reached 
into that area to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence even if he 
had been sitting inside the vehicle instead of being handcuffed 
in a police vehicle a considerable distance away. Due to the 
fact that Appellant was handcuffed in a police car several feet 
away from his vehicle, and that several officers were on the 
scene, the search of Appellant's vehicle cannot possibly be 
justified as a search incident to arrest and accordingly, the 
evidence should be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z<? day of April 1999. 
BOOKER & A5£OCTATtS§ 
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